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Truthful Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Task Assignment
Yonglong Zhang, Haiyan Qin, Bin Li, Jin Wang, Sungyoung Lee, and Zhiqiu Huang∗
Abstract: As an emerging “human problem solving strategy”, crowdsourcing has attracted much attention where
requesters want to employ reliable workers to complete specific tasks. Task assignment is an important branch of
crowdsourcing. Most existing studies in crowdsourcing have not considered self-interested individuals’ strategy. To
guarantee truthfulness, auction has been regarded as a promising method to charge the requesters for the tasks
completed and reward the workers for performing the tasks. In this study, an online task assignment scenario
is considered where each worker has a set of experienced skills, whereas a specific task is budget-constrained
and requires one or more skills. In this scenario, the crowdsourcing task assignment was modeled as a reverse
auction where the requesters are buyers and the workers are sellers. Three incentive mechanisms, namely, Truthful
Mechanism for Crawdsourcing-Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (TMC-VCG), TMC-Simple Task (ST) for a simple task case,
and TMC-Complex Task (CT) for a complex task case are proposed. Here, a simple task case means that the
requester asks for a single skill, and a complex task case means that the requester asks for multiple skills. The
related properties of each of the three mechanisms are determined theoretically. Moreover, the truthfulness is
verified, and other performances are evaluated by extensive simulations.
Key words: crowdsourcing; task assignment; auction; truthfulness

1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing has emerged as an efficient “human
problem solving” strategy for where the requesters ask for
certain workers to complete the tasks. Howe[1] introduced
the term “crowdsourcing”. It is defined as the method of
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outsourcing a specific task to an undefined set of people,
instead of assigning the task to designated employees.
In general, crowdsourcing can be regarded as a method
of matching requesters, who post tasks with a limited
budget, with skilled workers, who perform the tasks in
a timely manner to earn money[2] . The crowdsourcing
platform acts as a mediator between the requesters and
workers.
There are many crowdsourcing platforms,
such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)[3] , a typical
crowdsourcing platform where requesters post human
intelligence tasks to online workers. AMT offers only
“microtasks” with small rewards, such as social science
experiments and process photos, whereas TopCoder[4] ,
a crowdsourcing marketplace for software development,
offers larger tasks such as designing a software.
In this study, the task assignment in crowdsourcing was
modeled as a reverse auction, where the requesters are
buyers, workers are sellers, and crowdsourcing platform
serves as an auctioneer. Here, the terms requester and
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buyer, worker and seller, and crowdsourcing platform
and auctioneer are interchangeable. The human problem
solving process in crowdsourcing is shown in Fig. 1. In
each round of auction, the crowdsourcing platform first
screens the online players as the requesters and workers
arrive and leave over time. The requesters submit tasks
with limited budgets, and the workers offer their skills with
comparable costs to the auctioneer. After collecting all
the information from the buyers and sellers, the auctioneer
conducts the Winner Determination and Pricing (WDP)
process. Then, the winning workers are matched with the
requesters, perform tasks, and receive payments from the
platform charged from the winning requesters. Finally, the
requesters and workers rate each other according to their
performance.
Crowdsourcing has several issues such as designing
tasks, finding crowd, and quality control.
In this
study, we focused on the following challenges: First,
task assignment can be classified into offline and online
cases based on the accessibility of participants[5] . In
offline cases, the requesters/workers submit their ask/bid
simultaneously at the beginning, and there are no arriving
entities. Then, the crowdsourcing platform provides
the assignment results with all the available information.
Conversely, in online version, the ask/bid profiles are sent
sequentially when requesters/workers arrive. Online cases
are complex because the platform must make decisions
on the fly without a prior knowledge of players arriving
in the future. In the task allocation stage, not only
efficient task assignment, but also the quality of task
assignment should be considered. The task assignment
process can be improved by gathering and exploiting
knowledge on quality[6] . The quality of workers indicates
task satisfaction when the tasks are completed by them.
Considering malicious requesters, the quality of requesters
should also be considered. Naturally, rational requesters
prefer to hand over the tasks to workers with higher
qualities. Thus, the quality of players is the second
challenge in online task assignment.

Fig. 1

Model of task assignment in crowdsourcing.

The third challenge is the main focus of this paper, this
originates from self-serving players who may attempt to
increase utility by misreporting their bid or ask. Hassan
and Curry[6] categorized the dimensions of dynamic
assignment to optimization, constraints, learn, and context.
Slivkins and Vanghan[2] classified specific directions into
five aspects, namely, adaptive task assignment, dynamic
procurement, repeated principal-agent problem, reputation
systems, and one common theme: the explorationexploitation tradeoff. Although incentive models were
analyzed in Ref. [5], the incentive mechanism still has
not been considered in the literature. All the above
surveys did not consider the players’ strategy. In other
words, the payment in crowdsourcing is rashly decided
by the workers’ ask or the requesters’ bid. To guarantee
truthfulness, auction has been introduced into many fields
such as cooperative communication[7] , cloud resource
provisioning[8, 9] , and even crowdsourcing market[10] .
Undoubtedly, auction[11] is an efficient way to hinder
manipulation.
In this paper, we propose three incentive mechanisms
to solve the challenges mentioned above. The main
contributions of this study are as follows.
• In this study, task assignment in crowdsourcing is
cast as a reverse auction free from market manipulation.
An online scenario was considered where no prior
information is available about the players arriving in the
future. Moreover, the qualities of requesters and workers
were considered simultaneously. The task was divided
into two cases: a simple task and a complex task. For a
simple task, a Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG)-like scheme,
Truthful Mechanism for Crowdsourcing (TMC)-VCG was
designed. To overcome the imbalance of the budget and
high time complexity in TMC-VCG, TMC-Simple Task
(ST) that guarantees all the desired properties is proposed.
For a complex task, TMC-Complex Task (CT) requiring
the collective efforts of multiple workers was designed.
TMC-CT uses a threshold price to decide the payment to
guarantee truthfulness.
• TMC-ST and TMC-CT have good economic
properties including truthfulness, individual rationality,
and budget balance, whereas TMC-VCG satisfies two
of them except the budget balance because of VCG-like
payment. The simulation results verify the truthfulness of
the proposed mechanisms and then evaluate other desirable
performances.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 provides a brief review of related studies.
Section 3 describes the model system in detail, definitions,
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and design objectives. Sections 4–6 present three incentive
mechanisms, respectively, and then analyze the related
properties, specifically the truthfulness. Section 7 presents
the simulation results. Section 8 provides the conclusions
of this study.

2 Related Studies
As a promising paradigm, auction is applied in various
fields. In this study, we focused on incentive mechanisms
in crowdsourcing market. The related studies can be
categorized into two groups: (1) task assignment without
incentive mechanism and (2) crowdsourcing using auction
scheme. The related studies are shown in Table 1, and
the major differences in mechanisms between the previous
studies and this study are also shown.
2.1 Crowdsourcing without incentive mechanisms
In a Spatial Crowdsourcing (SC) scenario, Hassan and
Curry[6] proposed a distance-reliability ratio algorithm
for dynamic task assignment that aims to maximize
task reliability and minimize travel costs. Considering
the quality and cost, Distance-Reliability Ratio (DRR)
algorithm takes away the truthfulness of players. To solve
multiskill SC (MS-SC) problems, efficient approximation
approaches, namely, greedy, g-divide-and-conquer, and
cost-model-based adaptive algorithms are proposed in
Ref. [12]. Without regard to reward division, their
MS-SC problem assigns tasks to workers, so that
the required skills of tasks can be covered.
The
problem of Ref. [13] is an example of online knapsack
problem that aims to maximize the number of assigned
tasks with a fixed overall budget.
Although they
ignore the mechanism design, they claim that all their
online algorithms satisfy truthfulness.
In a largescale crowdsourcing scenario such as crowdsourcing
Table 1

Comparison between previous studies and this

study.
Reference
[6]

√

Offline
×

Quality
√

Truthful
×

√

×
√

×

×

×

×

[14]

×

×

×

[15]

×

×

×

×
√

[16]

×
√

×

×

×

×
√

[12]
[13]

[17]
[18]
[19]
This paper

software engineering, Yue et al.[14] proposed a searchbased approach to solve optimization problems. Failing to
consider the price mechanism, the search-based approach
simply finds a fit match between the task submitter and
virtual team members.
All the above studies did not consider incentive
mechanisms; therefore, cheating still exists in their cases.
Many players may benefit from the design, and the profit
of the platform may be damaged.
2.2

√
√
√

×
√
×

×
√

√
√
√
√
√

Crowdsourcing with incentive mechanism

Liu et al.[15] proposed four incentive mechanisms to build
a valid team to complete a complex task. Among
the mechanisms, optimal and VCG-like mechanisms are
not computationally efficient, and the greedy mechanism
is untruthful. Therefore, TruTeam[15] is proposed that
satisfies all the desired properties.
TruTeam uses
Myerson’s theorem[20] to ensure the truthfulness. Another
incentive mechanism using Myerson’s theorem is reported
in Ref. [16]. Zhang et al.[16] studied three models
of crowdsourcing, namely, Single-Requester Single-Bid
(SS-Model), Single-Requester Multiple-Bid (SM-Model),
and Multiple-Requester Multiple-Bid (MM-Model), and
designed an incentive mechanism for each of these models.
Considering the time and location information of tasks,
an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsourcing is
proposed in Ref. [17], where a VCG-like payment
scheme is applied to guarantee the truthfulness. In Ref.
[18], a Multiarmed Bandit (MAB) problem is added to
incentive mechanism in an online crowdsourcing scenario.
The budget is divided into exploration and exploitation
budgets for the sake of learning. Motivated from the VCG
mechanism design and greedy approach of the M-sensing
algorithm, SMART is presented in Ref. [19] for an offline
case. Besides, SMART algorithm can be easily used for an
online case.

3
3.1

Online
√

647

Problem Formulation
System model

In this study, the task assignment problem is cast as a
reverse auction that runs in a time-slotted fashion denoted
by [T ] = {1, 2, ..., T }, where T is a particularly large
integer. Each time slot t ∈ [T ] is a predefined time segment
such as an hour or a day. At the beginning of slot t,
several requesters and workers arrive in the platform. In
this model, it was assumed that there are τ types of skills,
and the skill profile is denoted by S = {s1 , s2 , ..., sτ }.
Next, the three entities in our model are characterized.
Requester: Rt = {r1 , r2 , ..., rn } denotes a set of
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requesters in slot t. Each requester ri ∈ Rt submits her
bid denoted by Di = {Sir , bi , qi,t , Iti , F ti } to the platform.
Sir = {s1i , s2i , ..., sτi } denotes the skill requirement of ri
where ski ∈ {0, 1} indicates if the task posted by ri needs
skill sk or not. bi is ri ’s claimed maximal price which she
is willing to offer for the given task. b˜i is used to denote the
true valuation of ri for employing the demanded workers.
qi,t represents the quality of ri in slot t. ri reaches in
Iti ∈ [T ] and will leave in F ti ∈ [T ]. F ti is the latest
time ri can tolerate to allocate workers. The bids of all
requesters are denoted as Dt = {D1 , D2 , ..., Dn }.
Worker: Let At = {a1 , a2 , ..., am } denote the set of
workers in slot t. Each worker aj ∈ At submits his
ask indicated by Cj = {S aj , Itj , F tj } to the platform.
k
S aj = {< skj , ckj , qj,t
>k=1,2,...,τ } is a skill vector where
k
sj ∈ {0, 1} represents whether aj possesses k-th skill
or not. ckj is a submitted minimum acceptable reward
for providing skill skj . Because of the selfish worker,
the true cost for supplying skj is denoted by c˜kj , which is
k
not necessarily equal to ckj . qj,t
is the quality of aj for
k
supplying skill sj , which is updated as t progresses. If
skj = 0, ckj = 0. Similarly, aj will submit the arrival
time Itj and the leaving time F tj to the platform. Let
Ct = {C1 , C2 , ..., Cm } represent the ask profile of all
workers in At .
Platform: After gathering Dt and Ct , the platform will
decide the outcome of the auction, which is denoted by
Φ (t) = {Wtr , Wta , P r , P a , σ}. Wtr ∈ Rt and Wta ∈ At
are the winning requesters and winning workers in slot t,
respectively. P r = {P1r , P2r , ..., Pnr } is the price vector
collected from requesters, where Pir is the price charged
from ri . Similarly, the payment reward to seller aj is
a
Pja , and P a = {P1a , P2a , ..., Pm
} is the payment to all
the workers. Most importantly, the auctioneer decides the
mapping function σ : {i : ri ∈ Rt } → {j : aj ∈ At }, i.e., if
j = σ (i), ri will employ aj to perform the task.
In this model, workers only submit the ask of a single
skill, and similarly the quality is evaluated singly. To
cope with gathered skills, the overall cost and quality are
imported. H = {h1 , h2 , ..., hτ } represents the weight
vector of S, where hk is the workload of skill sk . If all
the skills share the same workload, h1 = h2 = · · · = hτ . If
∃k=1,2,...,τ skj > ski , the overall cost oCji and overall quality
oQij of aj for ri can be calculated as follows:
∑τ
hk ski ckj skj
oC = ∑k=1
τ
hk ski skj
∑τ k=1 k k k
hk si qj sj
oQij = ∑k=1
τ
h sk sk
k=1 k i j
i
j

(1)
(2)

Therefore, the utility of winning requester ri ∈ Rt is
the difference between the true valuation and payment:
{
b˜i − Pir , if ri ∈ Wtr ;
r
Ui =
(3)
0,
otherwise
Similarly, the utility of winning worker aj ∈ At is the
reward from the auctioneer minus the cost of supplying the
skills rσ−1 (j) requests:
{
˜−1
Pja − oCjσ (j) , if aj ∈ Wta ;
a
Uj =
(4)
0,
otherwise
˜−1
Here, oCjσ (j) is the true overall cost corresponding to
oCjσ
3.2

−1

(j)

.

Definition of concepts

This section introduces several economic properties
desired to achieve and some concepts used in this study.
Definition 1 (Truthfulness). An auction is truthful if
and only if his/her true valuation is his/her dominant
strategy. Namely, the players cannot improve their utility
by misreporting their bid or ask. In our auction, this
indicates that for ∀ri ∈ Rt , if bi = b˜i , Uir is maximized;
−1
˜−1
for ∀aj ∈ At , if oCjσ (j) = oCjσ (j) , Uja is maximized.
Truthfulness is the most crucial property in auction
theory. Because exposing a true bid or ask procures the
highest utility, no rational buyer or seller will cheat any
more. As a result, the trade can be free from market
manipulation. In addition, irrespective of other’s behavior,
players will simply apply their truth-telling strategy, so that
the system will reach an equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Individual rationality). In an individual
rational auction. Therefore, the players will submit the
truth so the winner gains a non-negative utility, and the
loser’s utility is zero. In other words, no winning requester
is charged more than her bid, and no winning worker
is paid less than his ask. This signifies Pir 6 bi and
−1
Pja > oCjσ (j) for ri ∈ Wtr and aj ∈ Wta , respectively.
Definition 3 (Budget balance). Budget balance means
that the auctioneer gains a non-negative utility, i.e., the
money collected from the requesters is not less than the
∑
reward defrayed to worker. That is to say, ri ∈W r Pir >
t
∑
P a.
aj ∈Wta j
Definition 4 (Computational efficiency). The auction
mechanism is computationally efficient if and only if it
could be executed within a polynomial time.
Definition 5 (Social welfare). Social welfare is defined
as the aggregate utility of all buyers, sellers, and
auctioneer, i.e., the difference between the sum of winning
requesters’ bid and the sum of winning workers’ ask.
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∑

b˜i −

ri ∈Wtr

˜−1
oCjσ (j)

(5)

aj ∈Wta

An auction is system efficient if the utility of all players
is optimized.
3.3 Design objective
On one hand, as a traditional auction, our mechanism
targets three economic properties, namely, truthfulness,
individual rationality, and budget balance. One the other
hand, the objective of our mechanism is to achieve system
efficiency. The optimization problem is formalized as
follows:
n
m (
)
∑
∑
˜ i · xi,j ,
Objective : maximize
b˜i − oC
j
i=1 j=1

subject to
xi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ri ∈ Rt , ∀aj ∈ At , t ∈ [T ]
m
∑

xi,j > 0, ∀ri ∈ Rt ;

j=1

n
∑

xi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀aj ∈ At

(6)
(7)

i=1

The objective is restricted by Formulas (6) and (7).
xi,j = {0, 1} in Formula (6) indicates whether ri will
recruit aj or not. Formula (7) is the matching constraint
for all the proposed schemes. The first formula means that
each winning requester can be matched with more than one
worker, while the loser is assigned to no worker. More
concretely, in a simple task case, the winning requester is
assigned only one worker, while more than one worker in
a complex task case. The second formula shows that each
worker can be assigned to at most one requester.

4 TMC-VCG Mechanism
In this section, we propose a VCG-like truthful mechanism
for crowdsourcing, TMC-VCG for short. VCG scheme is
the most well-known optimal allocation scheme that can
guarantee truthfulness. Applied in a simple task case,
TMC-VCG offers sufficient consideration to quality to
improve the assignment process. Our theoretical analysis
proves that TMC-VCG achieves truthfulness, individual
rationality, and computational efficiency.
4.1 Design details
TMC-VCG consists of three steps: filter-players, WDP,
and update-quality. In the filter-players phase, the online
players are updated. Winning requesters, winning workers,
the charge from the requesters, the payment to the workers,
and the matching between the requester and worker are
decided in the WDP phase. After the task is accomplished
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by the worker, the quality of players will be updated in the
update-quality phase. Our VCG-like mechanism is given
in Algorithm 1.
Filter-players: At the beginning of each time slot,
the online players are screened, and then the remaining
procedure is carried out. Simply, if the termination time
of players is later than the current time, he/she is online,
and vice versa. The requesters in current time slot t consist
of Rt−1 , unallocated but still online requesters after the
assignment in t − 1, and nRt , the newcomer requesters in
slot t. Similarly, At is the aggregation of At−1 and nAt .
WDP: In the context of a simple task, the requester
demands a single skill to complete the task, i.e., for each
∑τ
ri ∈ Rt , k=1 ski = 1. As a variant of the bid, virtual
bid is applied as reported in Refs. [21, 22]. Combining
the bid and ask with quality, virtual bid and virtual ask are
employed in TMC-VCG and defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Virtual bid). The virtual bid of ri is the
product of bid and quality, i.e., vBi = bi · qi .
Definition 7 (Virtual ask). The virtual ask of aj is the
product of ask and quality, i.e., vCj = ckj · qjk . Here, it was
assumed that skj is exactly rσ−1 (j) demand.
Algorithm 1 TMC-VCG
Input: Rt−1 , At−1 , nRt , nAt .
Output: Φ (t).
1: {Phase 1: filter-players}
2: Rt ← Rt−1 ∪ nRt
3: At ← At−1 ∪ nAt
4: {Phase 2: WDP}
5: Create a weighted complete bipartite graph
G ← (Rt , At , W E),where wei,j ∈ W E is calculated as follows:
{
vBi − vCj , if ∀k=1,2,...,τ skj > ski ;
wei,j =
0,
otherwise.
6: (Wtr , Wta , σ) ← M W M (G)
7: for ri ∈ Wtr (do
)
8:
G−ri ← R−ri,t , At , W E−ri
(
)
′
′
′
9:
Wtr , Wta , σ ← M W M (G−ri )
(
)
⋆
10:
Pir = bi − vSW ⋆ − vSW−r
/qi
i
11:
Rt ← Rt \ {ri }
12: end for
13: for aj ∈ Wta(do
)
14:
G−aj ← Rt , A−aj,t , W E−aj
)
(
′
′
′
15:
Wtr , Wta , σ ← M W M (G−ri )
(
)
⋆
16:
Pja = ckj + vSW ⋆ − vSW−a
/qjk
j
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:

At ← At \ {aj }
end for
{Phase 3: update-quality}
for ri ∈ Wtr do
qi,t+1 ← Q (qi,t )
end for
for aj ∈ Wta do
if aj contributes skj (k = 1, 2, . . . , τ ) then
(
)
k
k
qj,t+1
← Q qi,t
end if
end for
Return {Wtr , Wta , P r , P a , σ}
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Definition 8 (Virtual social welfare). The virtual social
welfare is the sum of the difference between the winning
requester’s virtual bid and the corresponding winning
worker’s virtual ask, formalized as vSW :
∑
vSW =
(vBi − vCσ(i) )
(8)
ri ∈Wtr

A VCG scheme is normally based on assignment with
the maximum social welfare, while the assignment in
TMC-VCG scheme achieves the maximum virtual social
welfare. In the WDP stage, first a weighted bipartite graph
with two sets of nodes representing the requesters and
workers is created. The weight of each edge, wei,j ∈ WE
is calculated as follows:
{
vBi − vCj , if ∀k=1,2,...,τ skj > ski ;
wei,j =
(9)
0,
otherwise
Then, the Maximum Weighted Matching (MWM)
algorithm[23] aiming at maximizing vSW is selected, i.e.,
vSW ⋆ . From line 7 to line 18, MWM algorithm is
⋆
when ri is removed from
restarted for calculating vSW−r
i
⋆
auction and vSW−aj when aj is removed from auction.
The charge of winning requesters and the payment of
winning workers are shown as follows:
)
(
⋆
/qi
(10)
Pir = bi − vSW ⋆ − vSW−r
i
(
)
⋆
Pja = ckj + vSW ⋆ − vSW−a
/qjk
j

(11)

Here, it is assumed that skj is exactly the skill that requester
rσ−1 (j) needs.
Update-quality: Once the task is over, the winning
requesters and workers evaluate each other. The dynamic
assignment while learning is known as the adaptive
assignment problem in Ref. [2]. Despite the learning
process, our work emphasizes the solution to player’s
strategy rather than online learning. Hence, we will
not discuss the learning process, but adopt the existing
adaptivity algorithms. MAB is always studied to solve the
adaptive assignment problem. The function Q(·) in lines
21 and 25 can employ the algorithms reported in Refs. [18,
24, 25].
4.2 Analysis of desirable properties
In the following, it is proved that TMC-VCG has
the properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, and
computational efficiency.
Theorem 1 TMC-VCG achieves truthfulness.
Proof It has been shown in Ref. [26] that a VCGlike auction is truthful. Because of limited space, only

the truthfulness of requester is proved. The utility of ri
is computed as follows:
Uir =b˜i − Pir =
(
)
⋆
b˜i − bi + vSW ⋆ − vSW−r
/qi =
i
[
k
b˜i − bi + bi · qi − ckσ(i) · qσ(i)
+
]
∑ (
)
k
⋆
bl · ql − ckσ(l) · qσ(l)
− vSW−r
/qi =
i
rl ∈Wtr \ri

[
k
b˜i + − ckσ(i) · qσ(i)
+
]
∑ (
)
k
⋆
bl · ql − ckσ(l) · qσ(l)
− vSW−r
/qi =
i
rl ∈Wtr \ri

[

k
b˜i · qi − ckσ(i) · qσ(i)
+
]
∑ (
)
k
⋆
bl · ql − ckσ(l) · qσ(l)
− vSW−r
/qi =
i

rl ∈Wtr \ri

(

)
⋆
˜ ⋆ − vSW−r
/qi .
vSW
i

˜ ⋆−
Based on the above reduction, Uir = (vSW
⋆
˜ ⋆ means virtual social welfare
vSW−ri )/qi where vSW
∗
˜
is independent
when ri bids bi = bi . Because vSW−r
i
r
of ri , Ui is maximized when the matching is vSW ⋆ , i.e.,
when ri bids bi = b˜i . Therefore, no requester can improve
its utility by bidding untruthfully; thus, the truthfulness of
requesters is proved.

Theorem 2 TMC-VCG achieves individual rationality.
Proof The charge of the winning requester ri is
)
(
⋆
/qi . Among the parameters,
Pir = bi − vSW ⋆ − vSW−r
i
⋆
⋆
vSW − vSW−ri is obviously non-negative, so that
)
(
⋆
/qi is also non-negative. Therefore,
vSW ⋆ − vSW−r
i
r
Pi is less than bi . The individual rationality for workers
can be proved in the same way, we omit here.

Theorem 3 TMC-VCG is computationally efficient.
Proof We primarily discuss the time complexity in
the WDP stage. It takes O (mn) to create a weighted
complete bipartite graph. The time complexity of the
MWM algorithm is O (max{n, m}3 )[27] . The pricing
stages for requesters and workers are O (n · max{n, m}3 )
and O (m · max{n, m}3 ), respectively. Therefore, TMCVCG is computationally efficient.


5

TMC-ST Mechanism

In TMC-VCG, the imbalance of budget is unacceptable
to the auctioneer. Moreover, to overcome the time
complexity of exponential growth in TMC-VCG, we
propose an iterative incentive mechanism for a simple
task assignment, called TMC-ST. Our theoretical analysis
shows that TMC-ST achieves truthfulness, individual
rationality, budget balance, and computational efficiency.
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5.1 Details of auction
Similarly, TMC-ST consists of three steps: filter-players,
WDP, and update-quality; they are described in Algorithm
2. Among them, filter-players and update-quality are
the same as those in TMC-VCG; therefore, we omit the
illustration of the two stages here. Now, we present WDP
in details.
WDP: In each slot t ∈ [T ], we first sort online
requesters by Rank (ri ) in a nonincreasing order. As
described in line 6, Rank (ri ) is related to urgency and
quality. Simply, for ri ∈ Rt , the smaller F ti − t is, the
more urgent the task is. The larger the qi,t is, the more
trustworthy the requester is, the larger the qualityRank(ri )
is. Here, α ∈ [0, 1] is a tune parameter between urgency
and quality. The requesters in the top of sorted sequence
Algorithm 2 TMC-ST
Input: Rt−1 , At−1 , nRt , nAt .
Output: Φ (t).
1: {Phase 1: filter-players}
2: Rt ← Rt−1 ∪ nRt
3: At ← At−1 ∪ nAt
4: {Phase 2: WDP}
5: for ri ∈ Rt do
6:
Rank (ri ) = α·urgencyRank (ri )+(1−α)·qualityRank (ri )
7: end for
8: Sort all the requesters in Rt to get an ordered list,
Rt = {ri1 , ri2 , . . . , rin } such that Rank (ri1 ) > Rank (ri2 ) >
. . . > Rank (rin )
9: for i ← i1 to in do
10:
Ai = {aj | ∀k=1,2,...,τ skj > ski , aj ∈ At }
11:
if |Ai | = 1 then
12:
if bi > mbi and ckj 6 mbi then
13:
j = σ (i) , Wtr ← Wtr ∪ {ri }, Wta ← Wta ∪ {aj }
14:
Pir = Pja = mbi
15:
Rt ← Rt \ {ri }, At ← At \ {aj }
16:
end if
17:
else if |Ai | > 1 then
qjk

for each aj ∈ Ai

18:

Compute rel (aj ) =

19:

Sort all the workers in Ai to get an ordered list,
Ai = {aj1 , aj2 , . . .} such that rel (aj1 ) > rel (aj2 ) > . . .

20:

pi,j1 =

21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
34:
35:
36:
37:

k
qj1
k
qj2

ck
j

· ckj2

if bi > pi,j1 then
j1 = σ (i) , Wtr ← Wtr ∪ {ri }, Wta ← Wta ∪ {aj1 }
a =p
Pir = Pj1
i,j1
Rt ← Rt \ {ri }, At ← At \ {aj1 }
end if
end if
end for
{Phase 3: update-quality}
for ri ∈ Wtr do
qi,t+1 ← Q (qi,t )
end for
for aj ∈ Wta do
if aj contributes skj (k = 1, 2, . . . , τ ) then
(
)
k
k
qj,t+1
← Q qi,t
end if
end for
Return {Wtr , Wta , P r , P a , σ}
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have a higher distribution priority. If some requesters
have the same rank, they could be selected randomly or
reordered by requester id. In this study, the default way
is to reorder those requesters by requester id. We go
through the reordered requesters successively and search
the matched workers sequentially. We regard the allocation
to each requester as a single-round auction. For each
ri ∈ Rt , Ai is the set of unallocated workers whose skills
satisfy the skill request of ri . Here are two cases according
to the number of requesters in Ai .
• If there is only one worker in Ai , whether ri can be
a winner depends on mbi which is the median bid of the
latest requesters who are online or expiring throughout the
whole auction process and share the same skill vector with
ri . If the constraint in line 12 is satisfied, the trade between
requester and the worker is a success; otherwise, it is a
failure.
• If |Ai | > 1, there are more than one online workers
satisfying ri ’s skill requirement. As described in line 19,
the workers in Ai are ranked in a nonincreasing order of
reliability, which is defined as his quality qjk by ask ckj ,
i.e., rel (aj ) = qjk /ckj . It selects the worker aj1 with the
highest reliability. pi,j1 , the payment to the candidate aj1
is calculated in line 20. If bi > pi,j1 , the deal between
ri and aj1 is effective, or else ri and aj1 will not be the
winner.
5.2

Analysis of desirable properties

In this section, we prove that TMC-ST achieves three
economic properties, namely, truthfulness, individual
rationality, and budget balance. In addition, TMC-ST is
computationally efficient.
Theorem 4 TMC-ST achieves truthfulness.
Before proving the truthfulness of TMC-ST, we first
prove that winner-determination is monotonic, and pricing
is bid-independent. To differentiate truthful and untruthful
cases, we added tilde in the notations for the truthful case.
(1) Monotonic winner determination
Lemma 1 If ri wins by bidding b˜i , she can also win by
bidding bi > b˜i , given other parameters fixed.
Proof Algorithm 2 shows that the members in Ai are
related to skill request of ri . Hence, Ai is the same when
bidding bi or b˜i . There are two subcases according to the
number of elements in Ai .
• |Ai | = 1: When there is only one worker in Ai , ri
wins by bidding b˜i , indicating that b˜i > mbi . Accordingly,
ri can also win by bidding bi > b˜i > mbi .
• |Ai | > 1: Similarly, ri wins by bidding b˜i > pi,j1 ;
therefore, she can also win by bidding bi > b˜i > pi,j1 .
Thus, Lemma 1 has been proved.
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Lemma 2 If aj wins by asking c˜kj , he can also win by
bidding ckj < c˜kj , given other parameters fixed.
Proof We assume that the skill skj is the same that
rσ−1 (j) demands. In brief, when aj decreases the ask to ckj ,
the constraint ckj 6 mbi and ckj1 6 pi,j1 are still satisfied
whether |Ai | = 1 or |Ai | > 1. Therefore, the worker will
still win when decreasing his ask.

(2) Bid-independent pricing
Lemma 3 Given other parameters fixed, if ri wins by
bidding b˜i or bi , she is charged by the same price, i.e.,
P˜ir = Pir .
Proof As mentioned in Lemma 1, Ai is unchanged
by bidding b˜i or bi . Moreover, mbi and pi,j1 are irrelevant
to ri ’s bid; therefore, the price of requester is bidindependent.

Lemma 4 Given other parameters fixed, if aj wins by
bidding c˜kj or ckj , he is paid the same price, i.e., P˜ja = Pja .
Proof Similarly, mbi or pi,j1 is irrelevant to aj ’s ask,
so P˜ja = Pja = mbi or P˜ja = Pja = pi,j1 is independent of
aj ’s ask.

Lemma 5 TMC-ST is truthful for requesters.
Proof As mentioned above, the distribution to a
requester at a time is considered as a single auction in
which the truthfulness is evaluated. To compare the
requester’s utility when biding truthfully and untruthfully,
we discuss the truthfulness of requesters from four cases.
For ri ∈ Rt ,
Case 1: In slot t, if ri loses no matter bids b˜i or bi , then
U˜ir = Uir = 0.
Case 2: If ri wins by bidding b˜i but loses by bidding
bi , clearly U˜ir > Uir = 0.
Case 3: If ri wins when bidding bi but loses by bidding
b˜i , the above tells that Ai is invariant no matter ri bids bi
or b˜i . There are two subcases according to the number of
elements in Ai :
• |Ai | = 1: In this subcase, the reason ri loses by
bidding b˜i is that b˜i < mbi . Thus, ri will win by raising
his bid till bi > mbi where mbi is bid-independent. The
above shows that Pir = mbi > b˜i .
• |Ai | > 1: In the same way, aj1 has not been assigned
to ri because b˜i < pi,j1 . Therefore, ri must change her bid
to bi > Pir = pi,j1 > b˜i .
Hence, Uir = b˜i − Pir < U˜ir = 0.
Case 4: If ri wins whether bidding bi or b˜i , we know
that Pir is bid-independent from Lemma 3. Hence, Uir =
U˜ir = b˜i − Pir .
Overall, U˜ir > Uir , indicating that TMC-ST is truthful
for requesters.

Lemma 6 TMC-ST is truthful for workers.

Proof In the same way, we discuss the truthfulness
of workers from four cases. We assume that skj is the same
rσ−1 (j) needs. For aj ∈ At ,
Case 1: If aj fails to be allocated to rσ−1 (j) by asking
ckj or c˜kj , Uja = U˜ja = 0.
Case 2: If aj is allocated to rσ−1 (j) successfully by
bidding c˜kj , but loses by bidding ckj , then U˜ja > Uja = 0.
Case 3: If aj wins by asking ckj , but loses when asking
c˜kj , we discuss two conditions:
−1
• |Aσ (j) | = 1: The reason aj loses in this condition
is c˜kj > mbσ−1 (j) ; therefore, aj must reduce his ask until
ckj < mbσ−1 (j) . Therefore, Uja = Pja −c˜kj = mbσ−1 (j) −c˜kj <
0 = U˜ja .
−1
• |Aσ (j) | > 1: There are two potential reasons why
aj loses in this condition. One reason is that j = j1 , but
c˜kj > pi,j1 . Hence, aj must reduce the ask to ckj , i.e.,
ckj < pi,j1 = Pja < c˜kj . Another reason is that j ̸= j1 ,
−1
i.e., rel (aj ) is not the largest in Aσ (j) . Therefore, aj
must reduce his ask ckj till rel (aj ) is the first member
−1
in Aσ (j) , i.e., rel (aj ) > rel (aj1 ). When aj asks for
qjk
qjk
c˜kj , rel (aj1 ) > ... > rel (aj ), i.e., k1 >
; therefore,
cj1
c˜k
j

qjk
c˜kj > k · ckj1 . Hence, when aj changes his ask to ckj ,
qj1
k
q
j
Pja = k · ckj1 6 c˜kj .
qj1
From the two conditions, Uja = Pja − c˜kj 6 0 = U˜ja .
Case 4: aj wins by asking ckj or c˜kj . Lemma 4 shows
that the payment will not change no matter aj asks for ckj
or c˜kj . Thus, Uja = U˜ja = Pja − c˜kj .
Theorem 4 can be proved together by Lemma 5 and
Lemma 6, i.e., TMC-ST is truthful for requesters and
workers.

Theorem 5 TMC-ST achieves individual rationality.
−1
Proof In Algorithm 2, no matter |Aσ (j) | = 1 or
−1
|Aσ (j) | > 1, line 12 or 21 is built as the constraint of
individual rationality. For ri ∈ Wtr , Pir = mbi 6 bi
or Pir = pi,j1 6 bi , exhibiting individual rationality for
requesters. As well, for aj ∈ Wta , Pja = mbi > ckj or
Pja = pi,j1 > ckj also indicates individual rationality for
workers.

Theorem 6 TMC-ST achieves budget balance.
Proof Considering this one-to-one matching
between Wtr and Wta , |Wtr | = |Wta |. The clearing price
−1
−1
satisfies Pir = Pja no matter |Aσ (j) | = 1 or |Aσ (j) | > 1.
Therefore, it can be easily shown that
∑
∑
∑ (
)
a
Pir −
Pja =
Pir − Pσ(i)
.
ri ∈Wtr

aj ∈Wta

This completes the proof.

ri ∈Wtr



Yonglong Zhang et al.:

Truthful Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Task Assignment

Theorem 7 TMC-ST is computationally efficient.
Proof In the WDP stage, we first sort the requesters
with a complexity of O(n log n). Each round of for-loop
for requesters takes O(m log m) time. In total, Algorithm
2 has a time complexity of O(n log n + mn log m) that is
computationally efficient.


6 TMC-CT Mechanism
In this section, we consider the scenario where a complex
task may require the collective efforts of multiple workers.
In general, many complex tasks cannot be completed
with a single skill such as software development. We
propose TMC-CT for complex tasks requiring one or
more workers’ skill combination. Our theoretical proof
shows that TMC-CT guarantees truthfulness, individual
rationality, and budget balance, moreover a reachable time
complexity.
6.1 Design details
Similar to TMC-VCG and TMC-ST, TMC-CT consists of
three steps: filter-players, WDP, and update-quality. The
difference lies in the second step. We employ a critical
value to address the manipulation problem. The detailed
WDP process is as follows.
WDP: As illustrated in Algorithm 3, we allocate the
requesters in a greedy manner. First, like TMC-ST, the
online requesters are sorted as Rank (ri ) declines. In
line 10, Ai is the set of workers who satisfy ri ’s one or
more skills. If the skills of ri have not been covered
and the workers in Ai are not empty, we iteratively
select the worker aj with the minimum cost per marginal
contribution per quality as the candidate. Here, we provide
the definition of marginal contribution.
Definition 9 (Marginal contribution) aj ’s marginal
contribution to ri , ∆ij , is relevant to the ri ’s uncovered
skills that aj can cover if selected into Si , i.e.,
τ
∑
i
skj · ski · hk
(12)
∆j =
k=1

It should be mentioned that in each iteration, oCji , oQij ,
and ∆ij will be reassigned after ri ’s uncovered skills are
updated in line 24.
Next, it decides the payment to the selected worker.
If aj is added to the team successfully, he will be paid the
threshold price[15] that aj will not win if he asks higher
than that. Let us see how this mechanism rebuilds a
team without aj ’s participation. It selects al from the
∪
set Ai \{Si aj } with the minimum cost per marginal
contribution per quality. The above process is repeated
until the budget is over, or the task can be completed
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Algorithm 3 TMC-CT
Input: Rt−1 , At−1 , nRt , nAt .
Output: Φ (t).
1: {Phase 1: filter-players}
2: Rt ← Rt−1 ∪ nRt
3: At ← At−1 ∪ nAt
4: {Phase 2: WDP}
5: for ri ∈ Rt do
6:
Rank (ri ) = α·urgencyRank (ri )+(1−α)·qualityRank (ri )
7: end for
8: Sort all the requesters in Rt to get an ordered list,
Rt = {ri1 , ri2 , . . . , rin } such that Rank (ri1 ) > Rank (ri2 ) >
. . . > Rank (rin )
9: for i ← i1 to in do
10:
Ai = {aj | ∃skj > ski , k = 1, 2, . . . , τ, aj ∈ At }
11:
Ki ← ∅
12:
while Ai ̸= ∅ and the skills of ri have not been covered do
oCji
13:
aj ← argminaj ∈Ai \Ki i
∆j · oQij
∪
′
i
14:
A ← A \{Ki {aj }}
15:
T ← Ki
16:
while bi > Pja and ∆ij ̸= 0 do
oC i
17:
al ← argmina ∈A′ \T i l i
l
∆l · oQl
}
{
oCli
a
i
i
a
18:
Pj = max
· ∆j · oQj , Pj
∆il · oQil
∪
19:
T ← T {l}
20:
end while
21:
if bi > Pja then
∪
22:
Ki ← Ki {aj }, bi ← bi − Pja
23:
σ (j) = i
24:
update the uncovered skills in Sir
25:
else
26:
Ai ← Ai \{aj }
27:
end if
28:
end while
29:
if the skills
∑of ri have been covered then
30:
Pir = aj ∈Ki Pja
∪
∪
31:
Wtr ← Wtr {ri }, Wta ← Wta Ki
32:
Rt ← Rt \{ri }, At ← At \Ki
33:
end if
34: end for
35: {Phase 3: update-quality}
36: for ri ∈ Wtr do
37:
qi,t+1 ← Q (qi,t )
38: end for
39: for aj ∈ Wta do
40:
if aj contributes skj (k = 1, 2, . . . , τ ) then
(
)
k
k
41:
qj,t+1
← Q qi,t
42:
end if
43: end for
44: Return {Wtr , Wta , P r , P a , σ}

without aj ’s participation. As shown in line 18, the largest
value throughout the entire iterative process is selected as
the threshold price for aj . In addition, aj wins if and only
if the requester’s remaining value is no less than Pja . The
charge of the winning requester is the sum of payment to
the members in her group.
6.2

Analysis

In this section, we prove that TMC-CT satisfies
truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget balance.
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Theorem 8 TMC-CT achieves truthfulness.
Before proving the truthfulness of TMC-CT, we first
introduce Myerson’s well-known theorem.
Theorem 9 For players, the auction mechanism is
truthful if[20]
• Monotone allocation: If aj is allocated successfully
(
)
by asking ckj skj ̸= 0 , he will also be a winner by asking

The reason ri fails to be allocated is that the skills of
ri cannot be covered by the remaining workers or limited
budget. Therefore, if the requester with a limited budget
wants to be the winner, she has to raise her bid till greater
than the team’s ask. As a result, the requester will gain a
negative utility. Therefore, the truthfulness for requesters
is achieved.


ckj < ckj .
• Critical value: Worker aj will not win the auction if
he asks more than the critical value; in other words, the
threshold price is the highest price he could ask.
Proof It is obvious that the allocation rule is
monotone because if aj wins, he will also be selected by
asking a lower price, leading to a smaller cost per marginal
contribution per quality.
When computing the payment to worker aj , we select
a new team without the participation of aj . al is
∪
oC i
selected from Ai \{Si {aj }} with the minimum i l i .
∆l · oQl
Therefore,

Theorem 10 TMC-CT achieves individual rationality.

′

oCji
oC i
6 i l i,
i
∆ · oQj ∆l · oQl
oC i
oCji 6 i l i · ∆ij · oQij .
∆l · oQl
i
j

oCji
oCli
>
, al will be selected
∆ij · oQij
∆il · oQil
before aj according to our allocation rule. Therefore, the
payment to worker aj is temporarily equal to this value.
Otherwise, if

Pja =

oCli
· ∆ij · oQij .
∆ · oQil
i
l

Although aj can be selected as a winner, Pja may not
∪
be the highest price aj can report. Because T {al } may
not cover all the skill requirement of ri . Thus, we continue
to process the following iteration until the skills of ri have
been covered, or ri cannot afford the price. Finally, the
payment is equal to the threshold price described in line
18, i.e.,
{
}
oCli
a
i
i
a
Pj = maxal ∈A′ \T
· ∆j · oQj , Pj .
∆il · oQil
Notably, oCli , ∆il , and oQil are updated by including
a new team member. Because of the threshold price, if
aj asks more than Pja , aj will be replaced after the last
selected worker; in that way, he will not be selected to
perform the task. The above discussion proves the critical
value.
Monotone allocation and critical value are satisfied;
thus, the truthfulness for workers is proved.

Proof In line 21, we check if bi > Pja , i.e., the
payment for worker aj is less than ri ’s budget. bi will
be updated to bi − Pja as including a new worker to the
team, but the constraints bi > Pja will always be satisfied.
After all the iteration, bi ’s initial value is still larger than
∑
Pir = aj ∈Ki Pja , i.e., Uir = bi − Pir > 0. Thus, the proof
of individual rationality for requesters is completed.
From the payment rule for workers, oCji 6 Pja =
{
}
oCli
i
i
a
maxal ∈A′ \T
· ∆j · oQj , Pj . Thus, Uja = Pja −
∆il · oQil
oCji > 0. Therefore, the individual rationality of workers
is achieved.

Theorem 11 TMC-CT achieves budget balance.
Proof The above payment rule shows that Pir =
a
aj ∈Ki Pj , i.e., the charge of ri is the sum of the payment
∑
Pr =
to the members in the team. Therefore,
ri ∈Wtr i
∑
a
P , i.e., the budget balance of TMC-CT reaches.
aj ∈Wta j

Theorem 12 TMC-CT is computationally efficient.
Proof The time complexity of sorting requester
needs O (n log n) time. It takes O (m) to select the
worker with the minimal cost per contribution per quality.
Deciding the payment for the selected worker takes
O (mτ ).
Because there are n requesters, the time
complexity of Algorithm 3 is O(n log n + nm2 τ ). This
is computationally efficient.

∑

7
7.1

Performance Evaluation
Simulation settings

In this section, we simulate a crowdsourcing platform
where the requesters and workers arrive and leave on the
fly. The three incentive mechanisms, namely, TMC-VCG,
TMC-ST, and TMC-CT are implemented in this platform.
We first verify the truthfulness for the three mechanisms.
Then, we evaluate the performance of mechanisms for a
simple task and complex task. Finally, we compare the
number of transactions and running time of mechanisms.
For requesters, the number of transactions means that the
number of budget-limited tasks whose skill requirements
are satisfied by assigned workers. For workers, the number
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of transactions means the number of workers successfully
allocated to a requester.
The number of time slots is varied from 15 to 60, and
the default value is 30. We assume that there are 12 to
15 requesters and workers that arrive at the platform and
leave in any later time slot. The number of skills can be
varied from 2 to 10. For TMC-CT, the size of skill vector
exceeds 2 to ensure team formation. The quality of players
is randomly distributed over (0, 1]. The bid and ask for
different mechanisms are set in different intervals. For
TMC-VCG and TMC-ST, the bid and ask are randomly
selected in the interval (0, 10]. However, in view of team
formation, the bid of requesters in TMC-CT is randomly
distributed over (10, 15], while the ask of workers for a
single skill is in the interval (0, 5]. The tune parameter α
of requester rank is fixed at 0.7.
All the simulations were run on a Windows PC with a
2.94 GHz IntelR CoreTM 2 Duo CPU and 2 GB memory.
Each indicated data in the figures is the average result of
100 independent instances in each setting.
7.2 Truthfulness
To verify the truthfulness of mechanisms, we randomly
select one winner and one loser and then examine how
their utilities change when they bid or ask a different
value. Figure 2a shows that a randomly selected winning

Fig. 2

Fig. 3
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requester bids truthfully with bi = b˜i = 7.07 and achieves
utility 2.29. The utility with a truthful bid is the highest
among all the possible bids. The winning requester will
fail and gain no utility when bidding untruthfully with
lower bids. Similarly, the loser case in Fig. 2a indicates
when a losing requester raises her bid to win the auction,
she will gain a negative utility. As shown in Fig. 2b,
the winning worker achieves a positive utility if he asks
truthfully, but loses if he attempts to increase his ask. In the
same manner, the losing worker achieves zero utility when
asking truthfully, but wins with a negative utility. The
truthfulness for TMC-ST and TMC-CT can be evaluated in
the same manner as shown in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively.
7.3

Performance
assignment

evaluation

for

simple

task

Here, we introduce the optimal allocation for a single task
in the offline situation, i.e., OPTimal (OPT) ST. OPT-ST
borrowed from the optimal offline mechanism reported in
Ref. [17] can be described as follows: First, based on the
information of requesters and workers, a weighted bipartite
graph is constructed. Second, the MWM is employed to
carry out the allocation between requesters and workers.
Finally, VCG-like scheme is used to decide the price and
guarantee truthfulness.
Figure 5a evaluates the performance of social welfare

Truthfulness of requesters and workers in TMC-VCG.

Truthfulness of requesters and workers in TMC-ST.
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Fig. 4

Truthfulness of requesters and workers in TMC-CT.

Fig. 5

Performance for simple task assignment.

as the number of slots increases. The OPT-ST scheme
whose objective is to maximize social welfare achieves the
highest social welfare compared to TMC-ST and TMCVCG schemes. Normally, a VCG-like scheme will gain
a higher social welfare, while in this study, TMC-ST
achieves a higher social welfare than TMC-VCG. This
is because the social welfare of TMC-VCG is harmed
by using a virtual bid and virtual ask to the assignment
and price. Figure 5b shows that the utility of all players
linearly increases as the slots expand. TMC-VCG is
always superior to TMC-ST in the total utility no matter
requester or worker. This is because TMC-VCG is a global
optimal method, whereas TMC-ST is a local optimal
solution.

Fig. 6

7.4

Performance
assignment

evaluation

for

complex

task

In this section, we evaluate the performance of TMCCT. Figure 6 shows that the total utility of a requester
decreases as the number of skills increases. This is because
the demand of requesters will be more difficult to be
satisfied with larger skill combinations. The total utility of
a worker increases with a stable transaction count. This is
because with the increase in the number of skills, the closer
cooperation between workers will improve the utility of
individuals.
7.5

Comparison of three mechanisms

In this section, we compare the number of transactions of

Performance for complex task assignment.
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different incentive mechanisms. Figure 7a shows that
the number of transactions almost linearly increases as the
number of slots increases. It shows that TMC-VCG has
the highest number of transactions compared to TMC-ST
and OPT-ST. TMC-ST distributes task greedily while with
a lower number of transactions compared to TMC-VCG.
Clearly, TMC-VCG has the advantages in the number of
transactions. OPT-ST achieves the highest social welfare
while sacrificing the number of deals. The requesters
in TMC-CT demand multiple skills; therefore, it may be
difficult to satisfy their demand. Hence, the requesters in
TMC-CT gain the lowest turnover. However, the workers
in TMC-CT achieve the highest deal rate because of the
team formation between workers.
We conducted the running time test to confirm our time
complexity analysis for the three mechanisms. Figure 7b
clearly shows that TMC-VCG has the highest running time
because of complex iterations, especially in the pricing
stage. TMC-CT consuming most of the time in computing
critical value has a higher running time compared to TMCST. Moreover, the growth rate of TMC-CT is higher than
TMC-ST.

8 Conclusion
This study is inspired by the situation that selfinterested players in crowdsourcing may improve utility by
misreporting their bid or ask. We designed three truthful
mechanisms for crowdsourcing, namely, TMC-VCG,
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TMC-ST, and TMC-CT. Among them, a traditional VCGlike auction scheme, TMC-VCG, is designed for simple
task assignment, but not budget balance with a high time
complexity. Therefore, we further propose TMC-ST for
simple task assignment with a reachable time complexity.
TMC-CT is conducted in the context of a complex task
assignment, where the requester requires the collective
efforts of multiple workers. We examine the truthfulness
and other properties of each of the three mechanisms
in the analysis section. In the performance section, we
verified the truthfulness and analyzed the performance
for simple task assignment and complex task assignment,
respectively.
In the future, we will consider the social network of
workers in crowdsourcing. The requester who posts a
complex task such as software engineering would like to
employ a team with close relationship. In other words, the
workers prefer to cooperate with familiar teammates, so
that the task completion rate can be improved accordingly.
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